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The Euro area faces zero inflation paired with low eco-
nomic growth, at a time when the effective lower bound 
on nominal interest rates and large budget deficits are 
constraining conventional monetary and fiscal policy. In 
this article, we discuss the theoretical and empirical evi-
dence on unconventional measures of fiscal policy that 
increase inflation, spur economic growth, and keep the 
tax burden on households constant without inducing 
budget deficits. 
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in the US, most major developed economies are still 
showing sluggish growth, and southern European 
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experts argue that structural reforms are necessary to 
improve the competitiveness of these countries in the 
long run. But promoting a short-run increase in aggre-
gate demand is also necessary to jump start the 
economy. 
In his Marjolin lecture on February 4, 2016, the pres-
ident of the European Central Bank, Mr. Mario Draghi, 
asserted, “…there are forces in the global economy that 
are conspiring to hold inflation down.” (Draghi 2016). 
According to Eurostat, the annual inflation rate for the 
Euro area was -0.2 percent in February 2016 (Eurostat 
2016). On March 10, 2016, the ECB board agreed upon a 
set of largely unconventional monetary policy meas-
ures, with the aim of boosting inflation and growth in 
the Euro area. These measures were inspired, among 
others, by thoughts in Bernanke (2010) and Blanchard 
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costs and benefits of these measures is still ongoing. 
The conundrum facing the Euro area is how to find 
a recipe to support inflation, and ultimately consump-
tion, and economic growth in a setting in which tradi-
tional monetary policy measures are not viable, and 
governments cannot support growth with fiscal spend-
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article, we discuss an alternative to monetary interven-
tions, which we call unconventional fiscal policy. Uncon-
ventional fiscal policy aims to increase growth and 
inflation in a budget-neutral fashion, while keeping the 
tax burden on households constant through pre-an-
nouncements of VAT increases. Announcements of 
future VAT changes are also a salient policy measure for 
generating inflation expectations, which could be an 
additional advantage compared to unconventional 
monetary policy and traditional fiscal policy (see 
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and a related post which appeared on VoxEU.
D’Acunto et al. (2017) for a discussion on the relation-
ship between salience of consumer prices and inflation 
expectations).
UNCONVENTIONAL FISCAL POLICY
Feldstein (2002) introduced the notion of unconven-
tional fiscal policy measures at times of liquidity traps. 
Among several possible interventions, he proposed a 
series of pre-announced increases in value-added tax 
(VAT) to generate consumer price inflation, and hence 
increase private spending via intertemporal substitu-
tion. In his words: “This [VAT] tax-induced inflation 
would give households an incentive to spend sooner 
rather than waiting until prices are substantially 
higher.” The intuition for this proposal is based on a 
simple logic: announcing a path of increasing VAT 
mechanically will increase future prices and current 
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times of fixed nominal interest rates should reduce real 
interest rates (Fisher equation), and lower real interest 
rates should increase households’ incentives to con-
sume rather than save (Euler equation). Because higher 
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households’ labor supply, lower income taxes (or trans-
fers for those households that do not pay any income 
tax) should accompany the increase in VAT. Designed 
this way, the policy measure would be budget-neutral 
for the government, as well as for households. It would 
incentivize households to consume immediately, jump-
start the economy, and hence help it to pull out of 
recession. In his presidential address to the 2011 Amer-
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reiterated Feldstein’s ideas, and encouraged further 
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tional fiscal policy, both theoretically and empirically. 
In the United States, the proposal of announcing a 
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the future to speed up recovery at times of economic 
downturns has been advanced at least back in 1991, in 
an op-ed for the New York Times by Matthew Shapiro 
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proposal work? […] Consumers, anticipating the tax 
increase, would accelerate their purchases, particu-
larly of durable goods. This would stimulate the econ-
omy immediately, though there would be no immediate 
direct impact on the deficit.”
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF UNCONVEN-
TIONAL FISCAL POLICY
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business cycle stabilization. It is less desirable than 
conventional monetary policy due to implementation 
lags, larger permanent deficits resulting in higher long-
term interest rates and distortionary future taxes, and 
higher marginal propensities to save out of a temporary 
tax cut (i.e., lower (old) Keynesian multipliers). At the 
same time, fiscal policy might stimulate demand at 
times when conventional monetary policy is not 
viable. 
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Feldstein (2003) stresses that 
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not need to rely on questiona-
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fully operate through an inter-
temporal substitution channel 
by increasing private incen-
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expectations lead to higher 
consumer spending today. 
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can be expansionary and, at 
the same time, avoid budget 
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Farhi et al. (2013) formalize 
Feldstein’s ideas in a frame-
work with a binding zero lower 
bound on nominal interest 
rates. An increasing path of 
consumption taxes and a 
decreasing path of income taxes generate inflation 
expectations and negative real interest rates and stim-
ulate consumption, but do not distort the production 
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set the zero lower bound constraint without relying on 
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wasteful government spending. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON UNCONVENTIONAL 
FISCAL POLICY
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households’ willingness to purchase durable goods by 
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pectedly announced a three-percentage-point increase 
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unconventional fiscal policy compared to other changes 
in VAT. Firstly, the European Union (EU) imposed the 
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an infringement procedure for the breach of the Maas-
tricht Treaty. The VAT increase was therefore unex-
pected and unrelated to prospective future economic 
conditions, and qualifies as an exogenous tax change 
due to inherited fiscal deficits in the taxonomy of Romer 
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sovereignty as a member of the European Monetary 
Union. The European Central Bank explicitly excluded 
any increase in nominal interest rates to counteract the 
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As expected, the announcement of the VAT increase 
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inflation expectations, but the VAT announcement 
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terfactual is missing. To construct a viable counterfac-
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we look at households in other EU countries for which 
we obtained micro data (France, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom). Our empirical design uses matched 
households in EU countries not exposed to the VAT 
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households drive the results.
A concern is that these households might not 
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vides evidence that foreign households behaved simi-
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households with similar foreign households before the 
announcement of the VAT increase in November 2005. 
The matching is based on the propensity score, esti-
mated with observables that are homogenously elic-
ited across countries through the harmonized ques-
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foreign households are indistinguishable across the 
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centage points (s.e. 1.5 percentage points) more likely 
to be willing to purchase durable goods than before the 
shock, and compared to the matched foreign house-
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peaked at 34 percentage points in November 2006. The 
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alized. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests the 
three-percentage-point increase in VAT resulted in 10.3 
percent higher real durable consumption growth.
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Figure 1
In a large class of models, changes in VAT might 
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government announced a change in VAT, and hence 
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change household behavior under Ricardian equiva-
lence. If Ricardian equivalence fails, a tax increase 
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decisions through a redistribution channel in state-of-
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channels are unlikely drivers of our results.
WHAT SHOULD THE ECB AND EUROPEAN 
GOVERNMENTS DO?
The theoretical and empirical research discussed above 
has clear-cut implications for policy makers. These 
implications are especially relevant at times of low infla-
tion and low growth, paired with the non-viability of 
conventional measures of monetary and fiscal policy, 
as is currently the case in the Euro area. A series of 
pre-announced VAT increases and a simultaneous 
reduction in income taxes – or direct transfers for those 
households that do not pay income taxes3 – would 
result in a predictable increase in inflation without 
inducing additional uncertainty. They would increase 
consumer spending and hence growth today, and would 
not lead to higher budget deficits, all while keeping the 
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3  European governments have implemented direct transfers to selected 
groups of taxpayers and non-taxpayers in the last few years, which were not 
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budget (e.g., see the “Renzi bonus” in Italy).
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trap once conventional mone-
tary policy has regained power. 
The governments should 
reverse the tax changes during 
normal economic times to keep 
the gunpowder dry for the next 
economic slump. The reduction 
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ity trap could result in an addi-
tional boost in consumer 
spending.
These measures should 
be easier to implement in a 
consensus-based institutional 
setup like the current European 
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cal and monetary proposals. 
They could satisfy both the 
instances of Central and North-
ern European countries, which do not want to tolerate 
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instances of Southern countries, which want to exploit 
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the high tax burden on households. The fact that these 
measures do not involve further monetary stimulus 
or negative interest rates, but open a path to future 
interest rate increases, means that they would not be 
opposed by the banking, corporate and household sec-
tors of Central European countries.
If Mr. Draghi wants to counteract the “forces that 
are conspiring to hold inflation down,” Euro area gov-
ernments and the European Council might be his best 
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